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Red Families, Blue Families, Gay
Families, and the Search for a New
Normal
Jonathan Raucht
It is an honor to be with you today, and there could not be a
better moment to talk about law, values, and the meaning of
family in a time of tumultuous change.
I should begin with a caveat: I am neither a lawyer nor any
kind of expert on the law. I do think and write a great deal about
same-sex marriage and marriage as a whole-the two being, of
course, inseparable. And I try to think about the larger cultural
and social contexts which frame the gay-marriage issue and family
law more generally. I want to take my few minutes today to talk
about some reflections on a question I have had for a long time.
We know that gay marriage is very controversial. But why,
exactly?
Well, we know that some people oppose it because they
oppose homosexuality, and gay marriage, in their view, would give
society's and the law's imprimatur to a deviant lifestyle.' Those
opponents will, on the whole, never change. 2 Fortunately for
people like me, their numbers are diminishing with time.3
Contrary to what some of my friends in the gay-marriage
movement believe, however, homophobia is far from the only
t. Jonathan Rauch is a guest scholar with the Brookings Institution and a
senior writer with National Journal. His most recent book is Gay Marriage: Why It
Is Good for Gays, Good for Straights, and Good for America. This presentation was
given as a part of the Law and Inequality Symposium, April 9, 2010, "Family
Values: Law and the Modern American Family."
1. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, The Gay-Marriage Debate Resumes in
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A12 (describing the signs of gay
marriage opponents as "saying gays were godless and deviant").
2. Cf. Ben Smith, Is Gay Marriage 'Inevitable'?, POLITICO, Dec. 9, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30377.html (stating that research shows
younger people's views on this issue tend to not change as they age).
3. See id. (citing various data showing broader support for same-sex marriage
among younger generations, while older people tend to oppose it).
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reason for opposition. Another group, which I think is at least
equally large, feels threatened-less by the normalization of
homosexuality than by the abnormalization, so to speak, of the
conventionally defined family. "Nothing personal, do what you
want," they tell us, "but leave the definition of family-of
marriage-alone!"
One way to see that more is going on than homophobia is to
reflect, for a moment, on a peculiar fact: gay marriage is far more
controversial in America than either same-sex adoption or same-
sex child custody. 4
Think about that. Isn't it odd? The care of children, by
definition, involves third parties who often have little or no choice
about their situation. If there is a case for harm, one would think
it would be strongest here-not in the union of two mutually
consenting adults. In fact, the other side has a very hard time
articulating any concrete harm at all that gay marriage would do.
Yet efforts to make a political issue of gay adoption have
consistently failed,5 while, wherever it appears, gay marriage finds
it cannot not be a political issue.
What is behind the alarm raised by gay marriage?
To answer this question, I think one must widen the aperture
and look at same-sex marriage in the context of a much larger
cultural battle over the nature of family, of marriage, and even of
adulthood: a debate over what it is that constitutes, and should
constitute, the template for "normal" in all of those areas.
My thinking here is indebted to an important and interesting
new book by Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, of the George
Washington University Law School and the University of
Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, respectively. It is called Red
Families v. Blue Families: Legal Polarization and the Creation of
Culture,6 and I recommend it highly.
This book is more detailed and nuanced than my brief
treatment here can reflect, but I think it is not too far off the mark
4. See William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex
Parenting, and America's Children, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2005, at 97, 97-113,
available at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/
15_02_FullJournal.pdf (noting the less incendiary political climate surrounding
both same-sex custody and adoption compared to gay marriage).
5. See id. at 98-99 (discussing the general allowance of unmarried partner
adoptions and noting the separate treatment of marriage and adoption in most
states).
6. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010).
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to summarize their thesis as follows: Blue and Red America-the
predominantly socially liberal, Democratic areas and
constituencies and the predominantly socially conservative,
Republican areas and constituencies-are not just different
politically but are on opposite ends of the sexual revolution. 7 This,
in part, is why they are so different politically.8
And here, more specifically, is the difference between them in
a sentence (my formulation, not the authors'): in Red America,
families form adults; in Blue America, adults form families.
Meaning?
Cahn and Carbone make two interesting observations. First,
the Red and Blue worlds exhibit a marked, consistent difference in
the age at first childbirth and marriage.9 For example:
" States with the lowest median age at marriage in
2007 were all Red: Utah, Idaho, Arkansas, Oklahoma,
Kansas.10
* States with the highest median age at marriage were
all Blue: Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New Jersey."
* The same pattern holds for age at first childbirth.
Massachusetts, a Blue state, is highest (about
twenty-eight years old), while Mississippi, a Red
state, is lowest (about twenty-three years old).12
Second, Red states have higher levels of divorce and teen
pregnancy.13
In other words, states with the most-traditional family values
were the ones with, so to speak, the least-traditional family
outcomes, or at any rate the outcomes least desirable from both a
traditional point of view and from a public-policy point of view.
We gay-marriage advocates have sometimes thrown this
seeming paradox in our opponents' faces. We love pointing out that
7. See id. at 1-15 (detailing the demographic highlights of Red and Blue states
and the divergent attitudes towards timing of education, pregnancies, and
childbirth).
8. See id. at 4 (attributing the current "culture war" to the "dynamic of class
and regional antagonisms," which is aggravated by intentionally divisive political
figures).
9. See id. at 24-27 (reporting the median age at marriage and mean age of
women at first birth in all fifty states).
10. Id. at 25.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 22-28 (noting the states with the highest percentages of teen
births, pregnancy, and divorce).
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Massachusetts, the original home of gay marriage and supposed
threat to family values, has the lowest divorce rate of any state. 14
But there is more going on here than a "gotcha." There are deeper
forces at work, or so Cahn and Carbone argue.
Here is their story. I'm not sure it is perfect or complete, but
it is plausible.
For decades-if not centuries, argue Cahn and Carbone-
American family and economic norms were framed by two
realities, both taken as givens.
One: sex makes babies, and a core purpose of marriage and of
many other conventions is to regulate sexual and social behavior
so as to provide for the formation of stable, nurturing families. 15
Two: a low-skilled man, if he applies himself, can get a job,
make a living, and support a family. 16
Fact One gave rise to a strong linkage between sexual
activity, marriage, and procreation.17 They were seen as three
aspects of the same thing.'8 After all, it was (and still is) pretty
hard for teenagers and young adults not to have sex.' 9 So one
important norm was not to have sex before marriage. 20 A second
important norm was that, if you did have premarital sex and
conceived a child, you had to marry.2 1
Under those rules, families formed early-sometimes by
choice, sometimes at the point of a shotgun.22 That was alright,
however, because the man could get a job and support his wife and
kids.23 The woman could probably stay at home and raise the
14. See id. at 28; see also Div. OF VITAL STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, DIVORCE RATES BY STATE: 1990, 1995, AND 1999-2007,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datanvssDivorce%20Rates%2090%2095%20and%2099-
07.pdf (providing a table of divorce rates) (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
15. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 6, at 128.
16. See id. at 34-37 (noting demographic shifts across the United States that
have eroded the notion that a low-skilled earner can support a family in an
increasingly technological economy).
17. See id. at 1, 128.
18. See id. at 128-32 (discussing the overlap between sex, marriage, and
procreation in certain circles).
19. See id. at 20-21 (addressing the "teen divide" and speaking to the sexual
habits of teens).
20. Id. at 128-29.
21. See id. at 22-24 (noting that the traditional response to premarital
conception led to early family formation in many cases).
22. See generally id. at 33-41 (detailing the "shotgun marriages" of the 1950s
and the resulting divorces of the 1970s).
23. Cf. id. at 51-52 ("Both hourly wages and employment figures have
correspondingly decreased for men while increasing for women.").
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kids.24 Neither member of the couple needed an extended
education in order to meet their obligations as spouses or
parents.25
True, young people often make poor marital choices (or their
hormones make the choices for them).26 But that, too, was usually
alright, at least from society's point of view, because divorce was
stigmatized, fairly hard to get, and therefore rare. 27 The couple did
not necessarily expect deep personal fulfillment in marriage, a
certain amount of adultery was taken for granted, and more of
what would today be considered abusive or dysfunctional
marriages were thought to be tolerable. 28 So even a flawed
marriage was likely to be a stable one. 29 Over time, we had reason
to hope, the spouses would grow into their responsibilities. 30
That is what "families form adults" means. Many teenagers
and young adults formed families before they reached maturity,
and came to maturity precisely by shouldering family
responsibilities. Immature choices and what were once called,
euphemistically, "accidents" were a fact of life; but the unity of sex,
marriage, and procreation, combined with the pressure not to
divorce, turned childish errors into adult vocations.
This paradigm is a traditional norm-set, well rooted in the
human condition for untold generations. What the traditional
norms say is: keep sex, marriage, and kids linked and more or less
synchronized, and things are basically okay. Disassemble the
package and you get social chaos.
But now along come two game-changers (so argue Cahn and
Carbone): the global information economy and the birth control
24. See id. at 38.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 41-42 (noting that more premarital sex leads to more religious
focus on the topic, more failures to use contraception, more pregnancies, and, thus,
more "forced marriages").
27. Cf. id. at 38-39 (discussing the various factors that "unleashed the pent-up
demand for divorce").
28. See id. at 56-57 (citing studies showing younger people are less mature and
are more likely to engage in criminal behavior, abuse drugs, and have more sexual
partners than older people, behaviors which make relationships less likely to last).
29. See id. (noting that two factors--"immaturity and selection effects"-serve
to make the union less likely to last if the marriage is entered into before twenty-
one).
30. See id. at 56-59 (outlining the transition to adulthood and the importance
of institutions that guide this process).
2010]
Law and Inequality
revolution, which is what the sexual revolution mostly amounts
to.3 1
The new economy puts a premium on a high level of skill.
32
Even basic jobs require literacy and numeracy and a good deal of
cognitive sophistication, so a high-school education or less no
longer offers very good prospects. 33 Moreover, lifetime jobs
disappear.34 People need to be able to switch jobs pretty nimbly, so
vocational training and apprenticeship are no longer adequate.3 5
Blue-collar wages fall, 36 so a factory job often will no longer cut
it-if you can find a factory job!
Meanwhile, birth control means that you can have sex
without making babies, and people do. Effective female
contraception, in the form of the birth control pill, allows men to
shift the responsibility for unwed pregnancies to women, giving
more fathers the moral leeway to do what they were always
inclined to do, which is to walk away.37
And, of course, women stream into the work force, raise their
sights, and grow more economically independent-a good thing,
but with the side effect of contributing to a much higher divorce
rate.38
This is a very different world. In this world, early family
formation is often a calamity.
* It often short-circuits skills acquisition by knocking
one or both parents out of school. A frequent result is
a lifetime of low income.3 9
* It carries a high penalty for immature marital
judgment in the form of likely divorce. A frequent
result is family instability. 40
* It leaves many young mothers, now bearing both
children and the cultural responsibility for
31. Id. at 171 ('The sexual revolution began with birth control . .
32. See id. at 36, 51-52.
33. Id. at 51-52 ("The relatively high-paying positions available to men without
a high school diploma have moved overseas ... ").
34. Id. at 52 (citing an economics professor at Princeton University for the
proposition that "the drop in long-term employment for men has been dramatic.").
35. See id. at 52.
36. See id. at 51, 57-58.
37. See id. at 38 ("As women gained greater ability to avoid unplanned
pregnancies, men felt less obliged to marry the women they impregnated.").
38. Id. at 58.
39. See id. at 8, 57 (stating early marriage "derails education," and that higher
education is more necessary in today's job market).
40. Id. at 8.
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pregnancy, without the option of ever marrying at all.
A frequent result is poverty. 41
In this new environment, new norms arise: norms geared to
prevent premature family formation. 42 The "new normal" prizes
responsible childbearing and child-rearing far above the
traditional linkage of sex, marriage, and procreation. It enjoins:
Don't form a family until after you have finished your education
and are ready for adult responsibility. In other words, adults form
families-not the other way around. Family life marks the end of
the transition to adulthood, not the beginning.
Cahn and Carbone mention a very good example of how these
two quite different versions of normalcy ramify in contemporary
political life. Remember Bristol Palin in 2008? During the
presidential campaign, it came out that the Republican vice
presidential nominee's daughter was having a child out of wedlock,
but the family announced her betrothal to the father, Levi
Johnston.43
You might have thought that Bristol's broken chastity would
offend conservatives while evoking support from liberals. In fact,
reactions were more the reverse. To Red Americans, Bristol was
making her pregnancy okay by marrying the boy. 44 They were
kids, to be sure, but they would form a family and grow up, as so
many generations before them had done. To Blue Americans, on
the other hand, Bristol and Levi had committed a cardinal sin.
They had children much too young.45 This was the height of
irresponsibility, and a poor example to set!
Now, Cahn's and Carbone's story doesn't end there. A further
twist makes it more interesting, if also more sobering. They find
an asymmetry. Both normals, Blue and Red, have fervent
adherents and moral coherence. 46 But in today's world, only one of
them consistently works.
Blue norms are well adapted to the information age. 47 They
encourage late family formation and advanced education. 48 They
41. See id. at 165.
42. See id. at 37-41 (describing "the remaking of moral understandings" in the
modern United States).
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., id. at 3-5 (outlining various divisive issues in the "culture wars").
47. See id. at 35 ("The information economy similarly created greater demand
2010]
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tend to produce parents with maturity, graduate degrees, low
divorce rates, and one or two very coddled children. 49 These
families do well. 50
Red norms, on the other hand, pose a quandary in today's
world.5 1 Deferring sex is difficult in the current cultural
environment. 52 It was always hard to begin with, and the
availability of birth control makes it harder. 53 And, if you need
more school and are marrying later, you are required to defer sex
not to, say, age nineteen or twenty but to age twenty-three,
twenty-five, or even later. No wonder, as Cahn and Carbone write,
"even the most devout overwhelmingly do not abstain until
marriage."54
In any case, for a lot of people, a graduate degree or even a
bachelor's degree isn't realistic. The injunction to delay family
formation until you are twenty-four and have finished your
master's, or what have you, offers these people only cold comfort.
Many non-college-bound people need to figure that delaying
marriage and family formation wins them not much economically
while costing them several years of gratification and fertility. 55
The result of this Red quandary, Cahn and Carbone argue, is
a self-defeating backlash: "a set of reinforcing cycles."56
" Moral traditionalism fails to prevent pre-marital sex
and extra-marital childbirth. Demands for abstinence
delay sexual activity, but not much, and often make
early pregnancy more likely by reducing the use of
contraception. 57
* This increase in early pregnancy precipitates more
early marriages, which are more likely to end in
divorce. It also precipitates more unwed
parenthood. 58
for highly educated women ... creating even greater pressures to delay the
beginning of family formation.").
48. Id.
49. Cf. id. at 1, 34, 40 (describing the Blue norms).
50. See id. at 1.
51. Id. at 45.
52. Cf. id. at 37-38 (citing statistics showing that premarital sex and sex at
young ages are prevalent).
53. See id. at 37.
54. Id. at 43.
55. See id. at 41, 44-45.
56. Id. at 42.
57. Id.
58. Id.
[Vol. 28:333
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" Premature family formation, in turn, "derails
education and limits earning potential" and increases
stress on families. 59
* The resulting sense of social breakdown fuels more
calls for moral traditionalism. '[More sex prompts
more sermons and more emphasis on abstinence." 60
* The cycle repeats. 61
I think Cahn and Carbone may overstate the importance and
dynamic intensity of such a cycle, and the extent to which it
overlaps with Blue and Red politics. Much family breakdown, for
instance, is concentrated among minority constituencies that tend
to vote Democratic-though, it should be noted, those
constituencies tend to be more morally conservative, and in that
respect less "Blue," than upscale liberal Democrats. 62 But I do
think it is plausible to say that the Red and Blue normative
systems, while both morally compelling in their very different
ways, are not working equally well. Even if they did work equally
well, they put lower-skilled and less-privileged people on a
different and less-promising track than the so-called cognitive
elite. As a result, Blue and Red America drift further apart, not
just politically, but familially.
Now back, at last, to same-sex marriage.
The account I've given of different and diverging Blue and
Red "normals" provides an interesting perspective on gay marriage
and the culture wars-or, if you prefer, the family wars. In the
Blue and Red paradigms, same-sex marriage has entirely different
meanings.
In Blue World, same-sex marriage is wholly consonant with
the ethic of responsibility and autonomy as the pillars of family
formation. In this world:
* Mature adults form families to express and nurture
commitment to each other and their children, and to
share human capital which both partners have
already amassed.63
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 4 (addressing the relative social conservatism of the leaders of
more troubled communities, including minority communities).
63. See id. at 157-58.
2010]
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* Sex comes before marriage, and marriage comes
before children, and indeed children need never come
at all.64
* The decisions to have sex, marry, and have children
are thus distinct and separate. What counts is not the
linkage but the timing (not too early, at least not
without birth control!). 65
* The crucial moral requirement is not that the
decisions be linked or made synchronously, but that
they be made responsibly.66
In Blue World, gay couples fit the paradigm perfectly. They are
responsible adults trying to live more stable, more responsible
lives, and trying to improve the prospects of any children they may
have. Who could ask for anything more?
In fact, in Blue World, marriage is incomplete if it excludes
gay couples! Excluding them sends all the wrong signals about
family and responsibility. It would make a hypocritical nonsense of
what it is that marriage is supposed to be all about.
In Red World, things look very different. The Red project is to
maintain the linkage between sex, marriage, and procreation. 67 In
Red World, de-linkage has wrought all kinds of social problems.
65
Same-sex marriage, in this view, is in some sense the
ultimate symbolic assault on what is left of the unity of sex,
marriage, and procreation. "Ultimate," I might add, in both senses
of the word: "extreme," but also "last," the blow that completes the
most destructive demolition work of the sexual revolution. After
gay marriage, in the Red view of things, how can sex, marriage,
and procreation ever be put back together again?
It is no secret which side of the divide I am on.
I am a product of parents who married in 1951 at age twenty-
one and twenty-two. My mother was a very bright young woman
who gave up her graduate education to become a bored, unhappy
housewife. My father was brought up in a man-in-charge world
and found himself disoriented by his wife's need for an
independent life. My parents grew apart and their marriage ended
in an angry divorce. Theirs was a transitional generation. They got
64. See id. at 128 (stating that the emphasis of marriage in the Blue paradigm
is "committed love and companionship").
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2, 128.
68. See id. at 128-30.
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married under the old rules, the Red rules, only to find themselves
trying to be married under the emerging Blue rules.
By contrast, I am on the far side of the transition, as are so
many of my peers. I am entirely on the Blue side. My advocacy of
gay marriage is shaped by that perspective. No wonder same-sex
marriage makes sense to me! But widening the aperture, as I have
tried to do here, I think helps me to stand in the other side's shoes.
It is not that I think same-sex marriage opponents are right.
Even within their own traditionalist framework, gay marriage
makes sense, or at least more sense than the alternatives. But
that is a case I will save for another day.
Today I would merely point out a kind of integrity in their
position. If it were all about animus against homosexuals, or if it
all stemmed from lies about a gay menace to children, the custody
and adoption issues would be paramount. The deeper arguments
here are over what constitutes family normalcy, how we structure
the transition to adulthood, and who is entitled to set up a family
at a time when many American families are under all too much
stress.
I believe that, slowly but surely, family values are
renormalizing and will continue to renormalize around later
family formation and an ethic which stresses responsible
childbearing over abstinence from sex-if only because economic
and cultural forces are pulling so hard in that direction. At a time
when even many young traditionalists (evangelicals, for example)
take contraception for granted, are unable to abstain from sex
until marriage, and are unwilling to accept shotgun weddings, it is
hard to see how the old unity of sex, marriage, and procreation can
be sustained. In today's world, progress has got to lie in the
direction of discouraging early family formation and encouraging
(and improving) education.
Therefore it is hard to see how limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples can continue to make much sense even in
Red America. I don't think excluding gay couples from marriage
will do anything to strengthen or restore the old
sex/marriage/procreation unity, and I think trying to hold
homosexual couples to the old norm while heterosexuals live by
the new one will be counterproductive as well as unfair.
But I would also point out that young people will continue,
often, to be irresponsible; and that sex will continue, often, to lead
to unintended or unwanted pregnancy. I would try to keep in mind
that not everyone is in a position to put off family formation until
receipt of an advanced degree, and that the new, education-
20101
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centered pathway to adulthood may often be least accessible to
those who most need help getting started in life.
Gay marriage opponents are wrong, I think, to see gay
marriage as the problem and its prevention as a solution. But they
are not wrong to believe that, for many Americans, the new rules
are not a perfect or complete or sometimes even adequate
substitute for the old. And so I would hate to lose touch with the
traditionalist ethic along the way to whatever is coming next.
